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This master thesis describes effects of the Brazilian social biodiesel policies on 
smallholder farmers. Through interviews, documental analysis and a simulation model, 
it rejects a dynamic hypothesis about market manipulation by biodiesel refineries 
indirectly financed by these biodiesel policies. It examines some of the threats posed 
by these policies to conclude that their risks are more relevant when associated with 
pull migration factors. It analyses decisions smallholders make and reveals which of 
them are more important to their own resilience. It demonstrates that land sales timing 
is key to determine smallholder farmer resilience and that the emergence of industrial 
agriculture phenomena such as regional biodiesel supply chains might be an 
opportunity for them to leave rural areas with more assets, which can help them adapt 
to urban life. It recommends an array of policy instruments to mitigate the researched 





The latest IPCC reports (2007, 2014) point to bioenergy (BE) as a key climate solution 
and recommend an increase in BE production supported by public policy, especially in 
Latin America and Africa, continents with highest BE potential (IPCC, 2012: 226).  
However, Robledo-Abad et al. (2017) show that BE policies in these regions are not 
informed by science when it comes to the planning and assessment of their impacts. 
This is consistent to Rasmussen et al. (2018) demonstration that policy trade-offs 
between social and environmental (in this case, climate) aspects are stronger when it 
comes to non-food crops. 
 
BE policies might expose smallholder farmers in these continents to risks. Creutzig et 
al. (2015) built a compendium of potential implications of BE policies mentioned in 





Negative implications of BE policies from Creutzig et al. (2015) 
Type Negative implications 
Institutional Threats to land tenure and use rights loss for local stakeholders; 
Conflicts between forestry, agriculture, energy and/or mining; 
Impacts on labor rights among the value chain; 
Social Competition with food security including food availability, food 
access, land use and food stability; 
Discouraging local knowledge and practices; 
Displacement of small-scale farmers; 
Gender impacts; 
Environmental Deforestation and/or forest degradation; 
Impacts on soil quality, water pollution and biodiversity; 
Displacement of existing land uses; 
Trade-offs between different land uses, reducing land availability for 
local stakeholders; 
Economic Market opportunities decrease; 
Changes in prices of feedstock; 
Concentration of income and/or increased poverty; 
Uncertainty about mid- and long-term revenues; 
Technology might reduce labor demand; 
High dependence of technology transfer and/or acceptance. 
 
Hunsberger, Bolwig, Corbera, and Creutzig (2014) alert about access to land issues, 
related to income: land ownership concentration, rural displacement, among others. 
German, Schoneveld and Pacheco (2011), as well as Lima, Skutsch, and De Medeiros 
Costa (2011) demonstrate that, even when land ownership rights are respected, the 
emergence of biofuel crops in specific regions leads to land concentration in the hands 
of agri-business conglomerates. Clancy and Narayanaswamy (2014) describe power 
asymmetries in agricultural supply-chains and suggest increased levels of 
transparency and partnerships to mitigate them. 
 
Mainstream climate models utilized for climate-related BE policy recommendations 
incorporate farmer decisions mostly in a top-down way (Creutzig, Popp, Plevin, 
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Luderer, Minx, & Edenhofer, 2012) by assuming cost-optimal decisions, as opposed 
to the System Dynamics (SD) tradition, in which decisions rules are described from 
decision makers’ realities and treated as parts of models that explain structural 
problems (Richardson, 2011; Sterman, 2018). This is the reason why the Grantham 
Institute, a climate research leader, became interested in this SD master thesis.  
 
Alexandre Koberle (personal communication, May 25, 2018), a researcher at 
Grantham Institute and IPCC author, suggested a case study of a Brazilian public 
policy to understand how farmers involved in BE schemes make decisions that affect 
their own resilience and what could be learnt from the Brazilian experience, in line with 
the recommendations by Slade, Bauen and Gross (2014), who recommend the use of 
bottom-up approaches to inform the bioenergy policy debate, as well as Dooley, 
Christoff and Nicholas (2018), who demonstrate that current climate models, when 
applied to land use policy, may result in less consideration of social trade-offs. Daw et 
al. (2015) suggested the use of illustrative models to elicit taboo trade-offs in social-
ecological systems and incorporate views of less-privileged actors. 
 
Biodiesel policy in Brazil 
 
Brazil is the second most important BE producer in the world and the first in the 
southern hemisphere (World Energy Council, 2016), with a longstanding tradition as 
an ethanol producer and a relatively recent role in the biodiesel (BD) arena. A landmark 
in the history of BD in Brazil was the establishment of the National Program of 
Production and Use of Biodiesel (PNPB: Programa Nacional de Produção e uso de 
Biodiesel) in December 2004 (Brazil, 2004). The policy has three declared objectives 
(MDA, 2019, translated by the author): 
 
• To implement a sustainable programme, promoting social inclusion;  
• To ensure competitive prices, quality and biodiesel supply;  
• To produce biodiesel from different oilseeds, strengthening the regional potentialities 
for the production of biodiesel supply. 
 
As shown in Figure 1, most of this BD is currently produced from soybeans (ANP, 
2019b – April 2019), which means that it is a by-product of the soybean meal, 
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considered the main product extracted from the beans. In the south region of the 
country, where this research was conducted, the prevalence of soy is slightly higher, 
amounting to 74.79% of the total crops utilized in BD (ANP, 2019b – April 2019). 
 
 
Figure 1. Breakdown of sources of biodiesel in Brazil in April 2019 (ANP, 2019b) 
 
One of the key policy instruments utilized in the PNPB is a mandatory blend enforced 
by the National Oil Agency (ANP). Diesel importers and producers within the Brazilian 
territory are obliged to mix a percentage of pure BD (known as B100) into the diesel 
they sell in the country. This percentage has been increased over time by the country’s 
authorities, as shown in Table 2 (ANP, 2019): 
 
Table 2 
Evolution of mandatory B100 blends on diesel (ANP, 2019) 
Year Blend 
2006 2% (optional) 
















Another important component of PNPB is the Social Fuel Stamp (SCS: Selo 
Combustível Social), a social programme to include smallholder farmers in the BD 
supply-chain (Brazil, 2004; Brazil, 2005; SEAD, 2018). As a social criterium, BD 
refineries must buy a minimum fraction of their crops from smallholder farmers in order 
to have the right to participate in the B100 auctions. This fraction varies according to 
the region where the farmers are located: 15% in the North and Midwest, 30% in the 
Southeast and Northeast and 40% in the South of Brazil. This percentage can be 
discounted if the refinery buys from underprivileged crops, underprivileged regions or 
from cooperatives, especially if more than 80% of cooperative members are 
smallholders (SEAD, 2018).  
 
In exchange to complying with this social criterium, refineries have access to the 
government-organized auctions where at least 80% of the acquisitions must obey the 
social criterium. In these auctions, diesel importers and diesel refineries that are 
obliged to add B100 to their products buy B100 from certified BD refineries. The 
acquisitions that obey the social criteria also pay lower taxes that end up adding an 
extra profit margin ranging between 4% and 12% of the commercial price of diesel to 
the BD refineries (Hall, Matos, Severino & Beltrão, 2009; La Rovere, Pereira & 
Somoes, 2011; IPEA, 2011). 
 
SCS created an entire market structure for smallholders to be able to participate in the 
dynamic BD market, but also posed a risk of unbalance between small and large-scale 
actors (Abramoway & Magalhães, 2013). Da Silva César, Conejero, Ribeiro and 
Batalha (2018) characterize a “social soybean” production chain generated by PNPB 
and SCS, where sometimes BD refineries pay premium prices to smallholder farmers 
in order to ensure their supply and compliance with the SCS requisites. The concept 
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of smallholder farmer is also defined by law in Brazil, varying across regions. In the 
researched region, they have to be under 80 hectares to be considered smallholders. 
 
However, this set of policies seem to have created a concentrated market, with a small 
number of BD refineries which has stabilized in the latest years despite a growth in 
revenues (Antoniosi & Maintinguer, 2016), possibly generating a concentration of 
bargain power and profit margins in the hands of these players, expressed in both crop 
and land prices, the basis of the preliminary dynamic hypothesis on this paper. Figure 
2 shows the evolution of the mandatory blend and the number of refineries in Brazil 
(ANP, 2019).  
 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of number of refineries and the % mandatory B100 blend (ANP, 
2019). 
 
Da Silva César, Conejero, Ribeiro and Batalha (2018) interviewed several actors and 
analyzed the institutional structure of the social biofuel programme to conclude that 
producers tend to buy from small farmers only because of the benefits from the 
programme; the south of Brazil benefits more from these institutional pressures, as the 
local farmers are more organized. Martinelli and Filoso (2008) had already argued the 
same point about the ethanol policies.  
 
This is also in line with Machado (2018), who found that recent policies have not 
contributed to the climate resilience of small farmers in the Northeast, the poorest 
region in the country, despite positive short-term impacts on life quality and drought 
management. In fact, the south of Brazil and, especially, Rio Grande do Sul state (RS) 
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prevailed in the adherence to SCS at least until 2017, as shown in Figure 3 below 
(SEAD, 2018b), which also portrays a recent decline in the number of smallholder 
families involved in the SCS scheme. 
 
 
Figure 3. Number of families in SCS in the country, south region and RS state 
(SEAD, 2018b). 
 
Lima, Skutsch, and De Medeiros Costa (2011) found evidence of land concentration 
generated by the PNPB program, despite acknowledging existence of evidence of 
social inclusion of smallholders in some cases. These paradoxes in policy-design level 
are discussed by Fernandes, Welch, and Gonçalves (2010), who argued that BE crops 
have “changed the processes of land acquisition and use by both agribusiness and the 
peasantry”, making conflicts between them more explicit. Weinhold, Killick and Reis 
(2011) had already empirically related the advancement of soybean crops to economic 
inequalities in Brazil. Rathmann, Szklo, and Schaeffer (2012) demonstrate that the BD 
policies in Brazil fail to generate jobs and fail to tackle the regional inequalities in the 
country. 
 
As a matter of fact, in 2009, Hall et al. had already alerted that the Brazilian BD 
programmes could be evolving in the wrong direction, because of their tendency to 
favour large-scale production schemes. The contracts between farmers and refineries, 
involving price negotiations, were treated as a key arena that defines the outcomes, 
as also pointed by Garcez and Souza Vianna (2009). 
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Although they still have an advantage in terms of profitability when compared to the 
average of soybean farmers, participating smallholders’ margins are being gradually 
squeezed, as shown in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. Farmer profit margin from soybeans within and without SCS (elaborated by 
the author with data from SEAD, 2018b and Secretaria da Agricultura, 2018). 
 
Meanwhile, the BD refineries’ profit margins seem to be on the rise. Although few 
refineries have their financial data disclosed, one of the refineries cited by farmers in 
this study has had an impressive growth in assets in the last years (Figure 5): 
 
 
Figure 5. Assets of BD refining company in thousands of Brazilian Reais (BRL), 
elaborated by the author with data from Diário Oficial, 2019 and Corag, 2019. 
 
Part of the decline in farmer profit margins is explained by the soaring land prices, 
which increase costs (in the case of rented land) and opportunity costs (in the case of 





Figure 6. Land cost over revenue ratio in Rio Grande do Sul state in and out of SCS 
(Secretaria da Agricultura, 2018 and SEAD, 2018b). 
 
Egeskog et al. (2016) interviewed Brazilian farmers in the ethanol supply-chain about 
decisions regarding land use to conclude that they see BE crops as a diversification 
strategy from other crops and are willing to buy more land if land prices decline. 
Martinelli and Filoso (2008) had pointed that the ethanol policies in Brazil did not 
generate the intended benefits for small farmers. 
 
Therefore, it is possible to observe that land prices and crop prices are consistently 
mentioned in a specialized body of literature as sources of power and control by large-
scale agents over smallholder farmers in the context of BE (including BD) schemes. 
The risks of these schemes playing a destructive role and, ultimately, compromising 
smallholders’ livelihood is explained in qualitative and/or static terms, but no 
quantitative dynamic demonstration of the plausibility of this hypothesis has been 
conducted. 
 
Initial hypothesis and objectives 
 
Based on this context, an initial hypothesis (Figure 7) was established. It is 
characterized by a hypothetical “success to the successful” situation (Senge, 1990, p. 
113) where the social biodiesel policy is supposedly fostering the bargain power of 
refineries (also known as producers, as seen in the R2 feedback loop) as opposed to 
bargain power of smallholder farmers (R1 feedback loop). Such increased bargaining 
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power means that refineries could be controlling the land and crop markets, looking for 
a hegemonic position within the production chain and gradually constraining the 
farmers profit margins, which then makes farmers more prone to selling their land to 
the refineries themselves. 
 
 
Figure 7. Initial dynamic hypothesis, elaborated by the author 
 
In this causal loop diagram, if any reinforcing loop except R1 dominates, there is a 
depletion of the ‘smallholder farmers’ variable, which is potentially a variable 
determining resilience. R1 domination indicates the opposite: an increasing resilience 
of small farmers, helped by their adherence to BE crops and the social biodiesel 
programme. In case B1 dominates, the situation might be tragic for both farmers and 




Feedback loops of the initial hypothesis, elaborated by the author 
Feedback loop Description 
R1: Rampant farmer 
domination 
Smallholders’ production scale and investment capacity 
are continuously fed by the profit margins they obtain from 
producers, which is a result of bargaining process. 
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R2: Rampant refinery 
domination 
Refineries have more bargaining power if their economies 
of scale grow disproportionally more than the farmers. The 
social biodiesel programme increases their profit margins 
via subsidies. 
R3: Vicious farmer 
scale loss 
The more land farmers decide to sell the lower their 
economies of scale become, which makes them sell even 
more land. 
R4: Rampant refinery 
domination by 
increasing land scale 
Land acquisition and the consequent gains of scale might 
help refineries increase their bargaining power. 
B1: Programme 
stagnation by lack of 
attractiveness for 
farmers 
The social biodiesel policy depends on producers 
maintaining a minimum amount of their supply coming from 
smallholder farmers. In case this does not happen, the 
entire programme might fail, removing the subsidy to 
refineries. 
 
By testing the dynamic plausibility of this hypothesis, this research aimed to build a 
dynamic understanding of the effects of recent Brazilian BE policies (PNPB and 
SCS) in Brazilian small farmers’ resilience. The objective is further underpinned by 
the research questions and their consequent research strategy (see Methods). 
Research Question 1: What are the threats for the resilience of smallholder farmers 
involved in the social biodiesel programme, especially those generated by the 
existence of the programme itself? 
Research Question 2: Which heuristics, decision rules and thresholds guide 
smallholder farmers’ decisions that relate to their own resilience? 
Research Question 3: What happens to smallholder farmers involved in SCS when 




This thesis utilizes a multimethod process suggested by Herrera (2017) to analyze 
resilience using a system dynamics modelling approach. The concept of resilience 
here builds on a tradition initiated by Holling (1973), who characterizes resilience as 




The first step of Herrera’s (2017) approach is conceptualization, the definition of 
resilience of what to what. Specialized literature claims that resilience research must 
be defined in terms of “resilience of whom to what” (Carpenter, Walker, Anderies & 
Abel, 2001: 1). The system of interest in this research is small-scale farming in Brazil. 
To be able to further characterize it, a territorial focus in the south of Brazil was 
adopted, more specifically on the Rio Grande do Sul state, the most important BD state 
in the country. It is understood that, if a farmer abandons the farming activity in a given 
region of Brazil where BE crops are relevant, this means her resilience is 
compromised. If this becomes the case for a relevant fraction of the farmers in that 
region, then the resilience of the small-scale farming system in the region is 
compromised. The researched changes are the above-mentioned public policies 
(PNPB and especially SCS). Resilience is therefore not treated as a single variable, 
but analysed as a state or a feature of the system. Differently from other applications 
of system dynamics, resilience studies using system dynamics do not necessarily aim 
to explain all the observed behaviours from structure, but rather to interrogate to what 
extent system structure resists to shocks or changes.  
 
Another key principle in resilience literature is the slow versus fast variable approach 
(Carpenter & Gunderson, 2001; Gunderson, Holling, Pritchard & Peterson, 2002; 
Walker, Carpenter, Rockstrom, Crépin & Peterson, 2012). Resilience of socio-
ecological systems is considered compromised when the relationship between a key 
slow and a key fast variable in a system moves away from a long-standing state, 
usually called an attraction basin, depicted in a phase diagram. When this happens, 
the system ceases to exist as previously observed, generating a regime shift. 
It is hypothesized that ‘number of soy smallholder farmers’ (number of small farmers 
in a region) and ‘land prices’, depicted in Figure 7 above, are the slow and fast 
variables, respectively. 
 
This initial dynamic hypothesis (Figure 7), step 2 of Herrera (2017) approach, was 
based in the above-mentioned literature as well as in a preliminary documental 




The third step (Herrera, 2017) is the construction of a simulation model (see Model 
Documentation at Annex 1). For this research, a state-level, soybean-only system 
dynamics model was built using the modelling software Stella, based on documental 
analysis of interview transcripts and mostly official sources (ANP, 2019; SEAD, 2018, 
2018b; Cavalcante, de Sousa & Hawamaki, 2011; Conab, 2018, 2018b, Secretaria de 
Agricultura, 2018; IBGE, 2019; Barr et al, 2011; IMEA, 2019; Diário Oficial, 2019; 
Corag, 2019; ESALQ/USP, 2019; BiodieselBR, 2019) that contained model 
parameters. The model runs from 2008, when the policy started to be concretely 
implemented in the state and more consistent datasets started to be made available, 
until 2050, often the final year in climate research. 
 
Interviews are important in this process because, as argued by Forrester (1992), 
eliciting non-written data is key to understand decisions. In the non-SD resilience 
literature, this is echoed by Rogers et al. (2013), who claims for the incorporation of 
unconscious knowledge and limitations in the context of research about change in 
social–ecological systems. Luna-Reyes and Andersen (2003) suggest interviews as 
one of the methods for model formulation. Semi-structured interviews were therefore 
conducted firstly with farmers until a convergence was observed in the description of 
systemic phenomena, as performed by Kopainsky, Hager, Herrera, & Nyanga (2017), 
also observing the disconfirmation strategies proposed by Andersen et al. (2012) (see 
interview scripts at Annex 2).  
 
The interviews were conducted by the author, accompanied by an intern of the local 
agricultural extension office, in the Nova Prata and Veranópolis municipalities, located 
in Rio Grande do Sul, the main BD state and one of the most developed states in the 
country. Traditionally, agriculture in these municipalities used to be associated with 
corn for silage purposes, embedded in the milk supply chain. The transition to 
soybeans is still perceived as a recent phenomenon as milk is now perceived as a very 
low-margin product. Two BD processors are active in the region (hereby denominated 
Refinery A and Refinery B). 
 
The interviewees were: 
• 8 smallhoder farmers (average area 51 hectares, median 50 hectares, 
standard deviation 26.03; approximately 30% of the land they use is rented);  
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• 3 of them have soybeans as the main crop, 3 as the 2nd main crop, 2 as 
the 3rd main crop 
• 3 of them sell soybean grains to BD Refinery A, 1 has sold to Refinery 
B in the past 
• Refinery B founder and current executive director along with his supply 
manager; 
• Manager of the local agricultural extension office. 
 
A sequence of procedures described by Turner, Kim and Andersen (2014) from 
discovering themes to defining a model structure was adopted (see coding table at 
annex 3). Their price thresholds in terms of selling land and leaving the BE crops were 
elicited using nonlinearity elicitation procedures suggested by Ford and Sterman 
(1998). 
 
As for documental analysis used to determine parameter values involving more 
consolidated causal relations, the procedure was to download all publicly available 
datasets involving soy and BD. 31 datasets were found online using this criterium, as 
shown in Table 4 below, and use them when necessary. 
 
Table 4 
Datasets used for documental analysis, elaborated by the author 
Dataset Crop Source Period Frequency Scale 










































Year State (Mato 
Grosso only) 
Grain price Soybeans Imea 2016-
2019 






Soy meal price Soybeans Imea 2016-
2019 






Soy oil price Soybeans Imea 2018-
2019 
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Several BD BiodieselBR 2008-
2019 
NA National 






The fourth step (Herrera, 2017) is model testing and confidence building. Barlas (1996) 
guided model testing within this research. Each exogenous variable, including existing 
policies, was tested individually with a range of 10% positive and negative variation 
(20 runs for each variable, Latin Hypercube, uniform distribution).  
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Extreme value testing was also performed for all variables. Behaviour-structure tests 
were conducted during model calibration and helped refine model structure. 
 
In example, in Figure 8 below, the final (year 2050) simulated number of smallholders 
and land prices are depicted on a phase diagram that results from this type of 
sensitivity test for a variable called “minimum farmer land sales price”. On this graph, 
each coloured dot results from a different sensitivity run. The variable is sensitive for 
both number smallholders and land price, indicating that this variable could be an 




Figure 8. Phase diagram depicting sensitive analysis of “minimum farmer land sales 
price” for slow and a fast variable, elaborated by the author 
 
Following the sensitivity analysis for each individual variable, all the variables that were 
deemed sensitive for ‘number of soy smallholder farmers’ were tested again in multiple 
combinations which each other (200 runs, Latin Hypercube, uniform distribution), in 
order to allow an analysis of the multiple possible simulation outcomes depending on 
their values. 
 
Counting both the fourth and the fifth steps in Herrera (2017), 31 versions of the 
simulation model have been built. This includes model iteration from documental 
analysis (interview transcripts and other data sources), calibration (using reference 
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modes of behaviour such as Figures 2 to 6) and structural corrections generated by 
structure tests. 
 
Then - already in the fifth step of Herrera (2017), policy analysis - a third type of 
sensitivity analysis was conducted according to three policy paradigms inspired by 
Walker et al (2004): 
 
• Resilience: ‘number of soy smallholder farmers’ must not plummet, which 
relates to the first objective of PNPB (To implement a sustainable programme, 
promoting social inclusion);  
 
• Adaptability: farmer assets (including land and cash) must stay above bond-
adjusted levels to allow livelihood change when needed or desired, responding 
to an almost unavoidable rural exodus detected on the interviews. Government 
bonds are used as a parameter for comparison with farmer assets as these 
virtually risk-free returns represent a cost of opportunity the farmers face. If their 
farming activity is not profitable, they would rather leave the money invested in 
public bonds, earning the government interest rate; 
 
• Transformability: the policy objective is considered to be a change in the supply 
chain aiming to maximize the output of B100, which relates to the second and 
third objectives of PNPB (To ensure competitive prices, quality and biodiesel 
supply;  
To produce biodiesel from different oilseeds, strengthening the regional 
potentialities for the production of biodiesel supply).  
 
Transformability in this research is intentionally reduced to the ability to conduct one 
specific transformation (an increased output of B100). 
 
To be able to conduct this policy analysis, two scenarios were created besides the 
base case, based on a consolidated farmer migration typology known as the push-pull 
typology (Dorigo & Tobler, 1983; Jedwab, Christiaensen & Gindelsky, 2014; King, 
2012). Table 5 depicts these scenarios, created to allow policy analysis under different 
circumstances. They were created by varying sensitive variables (see Results of 
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sensitivity analysis) that relate to both “push” and “pull” farmer migration pressures to 
the limit of the tested (plus and minus 10% range). An exception was made to 
‘Min_farmer_land_sales_price’ in the pull scenario, where the value (8000 
BRL/hectare) is below the minimum tested value at parameter sensitivity analysis. This 
exception was made due to the need of testing a pull pressure strong enough to make 




Definition of scenarios based on sensitive variables, elaborated by the author 
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The three scenarios were also tested in the context of absolute absence of BD and BD 
policy in the system, to allow broader ‘what if’ analyses that attempt to assess PNPB 
as a whole. 
 
The push scenario implies a negative variation in crop and meal prices and productivity 
that could expel farmers from rural areas, whereas in the push scenario the urban 
economy in the country goes hypothetically well, with soy meal being sold at high 
prices and the farmers being attracted to cities, therefore asking a low price for their 
land. 
 
Another analytical tool called variance analysis (Brand, 2008; Brock & Carpenter, 
2006; Wade, Ritters, Wickham & Jones, 2003; Wissel, 1984) was implemented to be 
able to determine in which cases there is a probable regime shift in the system of 
interest. This was an attempt by the author to give a model-based response to an 
operationalization need that is explicit in the resilience literature since Holling (1973), 
who discussed the limits of stability analyses (such as the model-based ones proposed 
by Herrera, 2017). Herrera (2017) employs a visual criterium to determine the cases 
where regime shift occurs: if, after recovering from a shock, a key analysed variable 
returns to a level similar to the original, Herrera (2017) considers there is no regime 
shift. The unanswered question is then how different from the original state the variable 
has to be for a regime shift to be assumed. Variance analysis looks for a firm criterium 
to detect regime shifts: the presence of abnormal variances in the key variables of the 
system. 
 
Basically, the idea of variance analysis in the context of resilience studies is to track 
variance of key variables over time to be able to affirm how intense these variables’ 
variations was in different periods. Given that key variables vary a lot just before and 
during regime shifts (Wissel, 1984), the periods of more intense variation (higher 
variance) of these key variables might indicate the occurrence of a regime shift in a 
given period. This calculation was accomplished by exporting model data from Stella 
to Microsoft Excel and calculating variances over time on Excel.  
 
Regime shifts are here defined as “substantial, long-term reorganizations of complex 







The semi-structured interview process impacted the model dramatically from the initial 
hypothesis (Figure 7). Interviewees described two broader processes that they see as 
more important than the emergence of the BD supply chain.  
 
The first process they describe is verticalization and bargaining throughout the entire 
supply chain, not only by refineries, but mostly by other players: (pesticide, seed and 
fertilizer) suppliers, harvester owners, storage companies. These players sometimes 
play several roles in the supply chain. They often buy land. Suppliers even take land 
as guarantee in the contracts they forge with farmers. Table 6 shows some of the role 
allocations within the supply chain as described by interviewees, demonstrating that 
the six key roles described by interviewees overlap each other. 
 
Table 6 
Description of some of the roles in the supply chain after interview analysis, elaborated 
by the author from interview transcripts 
 







Refinery A Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Refinery B Yes Yes (not 
in the 
region) 




No Yes Yes No No No 
Typical 
storage player 
No Yes No Yes Yes No 
 
The second process they describe is rural exodus dynamics, including attractiveness 
of urban areas, lack of succession as farmers’ children do not want to stay in rural 
areas, subletting or selling land to bigger players and, sometimes, regretting and 
returning to rural areas. This second process, although not fully endogenized in the 




Among all risks and difficulties reported by interviewees, not all of them were 
incorporated to the simulation model, as some of they were too far from this thesis’ 
objectives and research questions. Table 7 shows the cited risks and their 
incorporation to the simulation model: 
 
Table 7 
Risks mentioned by interviewees, elaborated by the author from interview transcripts 
Risks Consideration in the model 
Abuse of economic power and land 
acquisition by harvester owners 
Yes 
Land price variation Yes 
Lack of succession No 
Drought Not directly, but through productivity 
shocks 
Storms Not directly, but through productivity 
shocks 
Limits imposed by environmental 
regulation 
No 
Corrupt buyers Yes 
Physical exhaustion due to sun exposure No 
Truck driver strike Not directly, but through logistical costs 
Fertilizer and pesticide prices Yes 
Crop price instability Yes 
Lack of available land Yes 
Frost Not directly, but through productivity 
shocks 
Work burnout No 
Health risks due to exposure to pesticides No 
Risk of financial default from cooperative 
and brokers 
No 
Access to water No 




Some of the risks that were previously hypothesized by the author, present in the 
interview scripts, such as food security of farmer families, have been rejected by the 
interviewees. 
 
Not all the decision rules described by interviewees were incorporated to the model, 
as shown in Table 8. Some of them occur in a completely different level of aggregation, 
others would require an expansion of the model boundaries to such an extent that 
would be incompatible with the purpose of this study. 
 
Regarding the destination of farmers who leave the farming activity (Research question 
3), a unanimous reaction was that they migrate to urban areas. Some regret later and 
try to return. 
 
Table 8 
Decisions mentioned by interviewees, elaborated by the author from interview 
transcripts 
Decisions Consideration in the 
model 
When to sell crops within the harvest year Yes 
Land acquisition Yes 
Land sales Yes 
Expansion of crop land by renting Yes 
Choice of crop buyer Not directly, but through 
% biodiesel processed 
by refineries 
Minimium acceptable soy price Yes 
Crop diversification/rotation Yes 
Migration to urban areas Not directly, but through 
minimum land sales 
price 
Difficult registration to sell to BD Refineries within SCS Not directly 
Acquisition and application of pesticides and fertilizers Yes 
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Harvester ownership Yes 
Dependency of debt No 
Acquisition of microrefinery No 
Storage ownership Yes 
 
To be able to consider the supply chain dynamics described by the interviews, the 
model now incorporates not only farmers and refineries, but also suppliers, harvest 
owners, storage players and brokers. All these players can acquire land in the model. 
The author had not anticipated, at the beginning of this study, that these players would 
be treated with such importance by the interviewees. 
 
Consequently, several stocks that did not exist in the initial versions of the model had 
to be introduced, as shown in Figure 9. Conversions among different types of land, to 








Figure 9. Extract from the model showing soy and BD production chain, elaborated 
by the author 
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The new model, summarized in the causal loop diagram below (Figure 10) and its 
respective feedback mechanism description (Table 9), is therefore able to simulate 
different types of land conversion (to/from other commodities, to other players, into 
soy, into soy oil, into soy meal). 
 
 
Figure 10. Second hypothetical causal loop diagram, elaborated by the author 
 
Table 9 
Feedback mechanisms on the second hypothesis, elaborated by the author 
Feedback loop Description 
B1: crop choice 
balance 
As soy requires a minimum level of crop rotation, other 
commodity crops cannot be infinitely depleted. 
B2: land market 
control by limited 
supply 
Lower land supply should generate higher prices and less 
conversion to soy. 
B3: land market 
control by limited 
profits 
When land is too expensive, farming is less profitable, which 
makes farmers willing to sell land, controlling land price. 
B4: land market 
control by limited 
demand 
Demand can only drive land price increase until before it starts 
affecting farming profits. 
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B5: land market 
balance by farmers 
and other players 
Downstream players buy land when they perceive the farming 
activity as profitable, but their interest also makes land prices 
higher, which limits farming profits. 
B6: land ownership 
balance 
Farmer land ownership counteracts other players’ ownership. 
B7: production 
limits by lack of 
farmers 
When other players verticalize too much, soybean production 
by farmers is smaller. Especially in the context of SCS, where 
a minimum level of smallholder presence must be maintained, 
this loop limits production. 
R1: amplification of 
downstream profits 
by soy production 
The more soy is grown in a given region, the more other 
players will profit from its production chain. 
R2: amplification of 
downstream profits 
by land expansion 
Other players, whenever they verticalize to agriculture, also 
benefit from farming profits, which makes them buy even more 
land. 
 
The model also contains a cashflow calculation structure for each of these players with 
a cost structure that is more detailed in the case of farmers and refineries (and, 
therefore, less detailed for other actors). 
An observer structure built to assess the assets (cash, land and installed capacity) of 
players with given combinations of market shares in different activities throughout this 
supply chain. In this research, this structure was mostly used to calculate smallholder 
farmers assets evolution over time. 
 
Parameter sensitivity analysis 
 
Of all exogenous variables in the model (see sensitivity documentation at Annex 4), 
only eight, depicted in Table 10 and on the causal loop diagram on Figure 11, impact 
the number of soy smallholders significantly. Six of them also impact land prices. It is 
important to observe that the biodiesel switch, that removes all the processes related 
to biodiesel when turned off, is not sensitive for ‘number of soy smallholder farmers’, 




Decision variables that were pointed by interviewees as important, such as ‘% land 
owned’ (as opposed to rented), ‘% harvester owned’, ‘% cash invested in land’ do not 
appear on the list of sensitive variables. Other variables that are often treated as central 
in the local debate, such as the price premium and the prevalence of fraud also do not 
play such an important role according to sensitivity analysis. 
 
Table 10 
Sensitive variables, elaborated by the author 
Variable Range Also sensitive for 
‘land price’? 











Market_control_premium 1-1.2 [unitless] Yes 

















Figure 11. Second hypothetical causal loop diagram with sensitive variables, 
elaborated by the author 
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Aggregated sensitivity analysis of highly sensitive variables 
 
If we test all these variables together (200 runs, Latin Hypercube, uniform distribution 
– Figure 12), we can see that, by the end of the simulation period (2050), the most 
probable outcome given the simulated ranges is the existence of less than 5,000 soy 
smallholders in the state. However, if we sum all possible outcomes between 25,000 
and 40,000, these are more probable than the worst case. 
 
 
Figure 12. Probability distribution of the final simulation outcomes of number of soy 
smallholders given a 10% (+ and -) variation of sensitive variables, from model 
 
Figure 13 shows that the level of uncertainty generated by this aggregated sensitivity 
test of the eight most sensitive variables in the model is high, as since the first ten 
years of simulation, a wide array of possible outcomes is seen. The fact that the 50% 
confidence interval is broad, shows that, although this is the more meaningful interval 
in terms of predictive power, this predictive power is very limited given the broad set of 
outcomes generated by the 20%-wide variation range in the sensitive variables. 
 
This means these eight variables are either powerful leverage points, and therefore 
opportunities for policies, and/or deserve more attention to the way they are defined 
and parametrized. As their definition is straightforward and these are operational 
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variables that can easily observed in reality, their potential for policymaking was 
considered enhanced. More analyses involving these variables are conducted in the 
next sections of this thesis. 
 
 
Figure 13. Confidence intervals over time for number of soy smallholders given a 




Scenario analysis was conducted to assess the performance of each of the three 
scenarios considering three different criteria (see Methods): resilience (number of soy 
smallholders), adaptability (typical smallholder assets versus the same initial assets 
invested in government bonds), transformability (output of B100 versus the maximum 
capacity given the evolution of the diesel blend policy). A variation without BD in the 
system was tested in each of the three scenarios. 
 
In the base case (Figures 14 to 16), the development of the soybeans supply chain in 
the first three years of simulation leads to an increase in the number of soy 
smallholders and in the assets of a typical smallholder. Part of this adjustment in assets 
(during the period where it shows a slightly convex curve in the very of beginning of 
simulation) is a consequence of a transient adjustment of the initial stock of cash 
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throughout the chain (see Moxnes & Davidsen, 2017) in combination with a relevant 
conversion from other commodities to soy that is present in the datasets. Interviewees 
indeed report a sudden increase in prices around 10 years ago, when the soy 
plantations started to be taken more professionally by local agents. 
The base case shows a stable behaviour of the number of smallholders and their 
assets, therefore performing well for the adopted criteria on resilience and adaptability. 
The cases without BD do not represent a relevant difference in terms of resilience and 
adaptability. 
 
Figure 14 below shows that there is no imminent threat to resilience in the base case, 
and the presence of BD also does not affect the system of interest too much. 
 
 
Figure 14. Number of soy smallholders over time in the base case with and without 
BD, generated by the model 
 
Figure 15 shows that the initial adjustments create assets to smallholder farmers, 
who then profit from this adjustment in the next decades. However, it is possible to 
observe that the window of opportunity for farmers to enjoy this increase asset level 




Figure 15. Assets of a typical smallholder over time in the base case with and without 
BD as compared to government bond-adjusted assets, generated by the model 
 
Except for a period between 2021 and 2033 in Figure 16, when B100 production is 
catching up with the increased blend, the output is the maximum possible output, 
indicating that the transformation of the system is driving to the direction of the policy 
objectives set by the State. 
 
 
Figure 16. B100 production over time in the base case as compared to the maximum 
production capacity driven by the blend policy, generated by the model 
 
In the push scenario (Figures 17 to 19), a strong decline in the number of soy 
smallholders occurs in both the usual and no BD scenarios, mainly due to conversion 
to other commodity crops. The assets of a typical smallholder present an initial decline 
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and remain relatively stable until the small farming soybean activity disappears. The 
B100 output goals are not achieved, as seen in Figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 17. Number of soy smallholders over time in the push scenario with and 
without BD, generated by the model 
 
 
Figure 18. Assets of a typical smallholder over time in the push scenario with and 






Figure 19. B100 production over time in the push scenario as compared to the 
maximum production capacity driven by the blend policy, generated by the model 
 
In the pull scenario (Figures 20 to 22), there is a slower decline in terms of number of 
smallholders (Figure 20), and B100 output goes as planned (Figure 22). The effect of 
turning biodiesel off in the model is more important in this scenario, especially in terms 
of preventing smallholders to leave their farms. It is possible to identify a trade-off 
between resilience and adaptability, since, although the number of smallholders is 
lower with BD (Figure 20), the typical smallholder assets are higher (Figure 21). This 
is due to the effect of verticalization: more smallholders sell their land in this scenario 
exactly because land price (an important factor of their assets) is attractive for sale. As 






Figure 20. Number of soy smallholders over time in the pull scenario with and without 
BD, generated by the model 
 
Figure 21 shows that BD plays a role in increasing the opportunity of farmers to 
increase their assets. The window of opportunity for them to sell their assets with a 
bond-adjusted profit is longer in the case where BD is present in the system. The 
oscillations between 2011 and 2017, caused by delays in adjustments of land price to 
demand that also adjust to perceived profitability of soybean agriculture, show that a 
farmer who sells land at a sub-optimal moment might be making a tragic decision for 
his future lifestyle. 
 
Figure 21. Assets of a typical smallholder over time in the pull scenario with and 
without BD as compared to government bond-adjusted assets, generated by the 
model 
 
Figure 22 shows a behaviour of B100 production and, therefore, system 





Figure 22. B100 production over time in the pull scenario as compared to the 




The variances of the slow variable over time for each scenario (number of soy 
smallholder farmers variances – Figures 23 to 25) show what is already possible to be 
identified visually in the scenario analysis: only the push scenario generates a change 
that is strong enough to be considered a regime shift, which can be seen by the strong 
growth in variance from 2013 to 2024. Only this scenario generates changes that are 
strong enough not to be fully absorbed by the structure of the modelled system. The 
base case and the pull scenario allow the local small farming system to stay in the 





Figure 23. Variance over time of number of smallholder farmers in the base case, 
elaborated by the author 
 
 
Figure 24. Variance over time of number of smallholder farmers in the push scenario, 
elaborated by the author 
 
 
Figure 25. Variance over time of number of smallholder farmers in the pull scenario, 
elaborated by the author 
 
In both the push and the pull scenarios (Figures 26 and 27), when we observe the 
variance of the fast variable (land prices) over time versus the behaviour of the slow 
variable, we may argue that a strong change in the fast variable anticipated the strong 
decline in the slow variable (number of smallholders), consistent with the observations 
by Brock and Carpenter (2006). The change is not as important in the pull scenario, as 





Figure 26. Variance of the fast variable (blue, left axis) vs behaviour of the slow 
variable over time (orange, right axis) in the push scenario, elaborated by the author 
 
 
Figure 27. Variance of the fast variable (blue, left axis) vs behaviour of the slow 
variable over time (orange, right axis) in the pull scenario, elaborated by the author 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
This system dynamics model-based resilience study aimed to describe effects of the 
Brazilian social biodiesel policies on smallholder farming by uncovering their risks, 
decisions and effects (research questions 1, 2 and 3, respectively). 
 
The results of sensitivity, scenario and variance analyses indicate that the presence of 
BD in the soybeans production chain does not undermine resilience of smallholder 
farmers in the base case, which means a rejection of the central hypothesis of this 
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research, although a 20%-wide sensitivity analysis range in the most sensitive 
variables generates high levels of uncertainty.  
 
The balancing loops (Figure 10) dominate the base case, generating stability by 
maintaining equilibrated land markets (B2, B3 and B4), crop conversion (B1) and soy 
supply (B7). To draw this conclusion, we build on Bueno (2012) loop dominance 
analysis for resilience studies. The author suggests a procedure to observe shifts in 
loop dominance in social-ecological systems by first defining variables of interest, then 
conducting sensitivity analysis and, finally, tracking the structural reasons behind 
sensitivity by identifying shifts in loop polarity. 
 
Research Question 1: What are the threats for the resilience of smallholder 
farmers involved in the social biodiesel programme, especially those generated 
by the existence of the programme itself? 
 
The dynamic hypothesis of this study and the BD policies alone do not explain the 
recent decrease in smallholder farmers in the programme seen in Figure 3. 
Smallholder resilience loss in the region depends on the prevalence of push and/or 
pull migration factors, which are connected to two larger-scale phenomena mentioned 
by the interviewees, involving risks that were not comprised by the initial hypothesis of 
this study, composing an unexpected answer for research question 1: the rise of 
industrial agriculture (where players across the supply chains may verticalize their 
activities, which includes acquisition of land) and rural exodus (connected to 
generational, succession issues). Should BE policies be implemented without 
articulating these two broader aspects? The question remains open for future studies. 
 
The characterization of the BD production chain by Da Silva et al. (2018) is not 
completely supported by this model analysis, as smallholder crop conversion to 
soybeans happens regardless of the presence of BD in the system. Interview results 
and model analyses indicate that regional BD production schemes are one of the 
manifestations of a broader phenomenon, namely the rise of industrial agriculture. 
 
However, scenario analysis indicates that BD and, therefore, the policies that created 
an entire BD supply chain in Brazil (PNPB and SCS) might amplify pull factors. In other 
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words, when urban life is attractive, BD might make it even more attractive, and this 
combination might disrupt the smallholder farming system of entire regions by 
stimulating smallholder farmers to gradually sell their land and migrate to urban areas. 
As demonstrated in the pull scenario results (Figures 20 and 21), BD is relevant in 
augmenting this rural exodus process. 
 
Despite the relative stability in the base case, probability of regime shift is significant 
given a 10% variation (up or down) in the set of eight sensitive variables and even 
higher when push factors are in place. As shown on Figure 11, the lowest ten 
percentiles for the final number of soy smallholders are the most probable set of ten 
percentiles among the possible outcomes, although highest outcomes are highly 
probable. This might be interpreted as a high level of vulnerability to external factors 
on this production chain that includes BD and other soy products. Should the Brazilian 
government decide on behalf of taxpayers to incentivize this economic sector so 
heavily given this vulnerability to external factors? This question also remains to be 
answered by future studies. 
 
The impacts of push factors are connected to the dependency of farmers to one or few 
crops, as they become more susceptible to variations in the profit margins of few crops. 
The abrupt impact of push factors in scenario analysis, as well as the demonstration 
that the initial stocks of soy land versus other commodities is sensitive, allow us to 
endorse for BD what Egeskog et al. (2016) had already observed in the case of 
ethanol: crop diversification seems to be a potential risk-management policy for soy 
smallholders in the context of emerging BE schemes. 
 
Most simulated regime shifts in the push scenario occur not because of the action of 
the reinforcing loops R1 and R2, but due to conversion from soy to other commodity 
crops, which, in the reality of the interviewed farmers, would be corn. It is therefore 
questionable if this situation should even be considered a regime shift, as they would 
only be jumping to a commodity from another. 
 
Situations where R1 and R2 in fact dominate (Figure 28 below), generating a decline 
of smallholder farming, can be seen in three different cases: extremely high soy meal 
prices, coordination between market players to isolate small farmers by charging more 
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for goods and services (‘market control premium’) or extremely low minimum land sales 
prices by farmers.  
 
The latter two might be understood as components of a tragedy of the commons, 
involving different agents, that might reinforce each other. In the case of coordination 
between market players, suppliers and downstream players such as harvester and 
storage providers could end up without customers. In the case of extremely low 
minimum land sales prices, farmers would rush to sell their land as soon as they 
noticed land prices were up. Depending on the soy meal prices and the ‘market control 
premium’, this willingness to sell land by some farmers could end up isolating other 
small farmers in the region, generating a tragic situation for the ones who stay in the 
small-scale farming activity. This is a relevant risk dynamic to which farmers should 




Figure 28. Causal loop diagram illustrating the dominance of reinforcing loops 
leading to a regime shift, generated by the model 
 
Research Question 2: Which heuristics, decision rules and thresholds guide 




To answer the second research question of this study, regarding farmer decisions that 
bounce back to their own resilience, sensitivity analysis indicates that the key decisions 
farmers face are the following:  
• How much soy to grow in their farms as compared to other commodities 
(expressed as ‘Initial_soy_land’ versus ‘Initial_other_commodities’), as farmers 
might be too exposed to soy grain and meal prices;  
• How much crop rotation to perform or, in agricultural terms, the choice of crops 
and seed varieties that require less rotation (expressed as 
‘Minimum_crop_rotation’); 
• From what price on to sell land (expressed as ‘Min_farmer_land_sales_price), 
which relates to ‘when’ to sell land and leave the rural areas. 
 
Efforts to increase soy productivity might pay off as well, as indicated by the high 
sensitivity of ‘ref_soy_productivity’. 
 
Relevant decisions across the supply chain 
 
Besides the farmer decisions that impact their own resilience, an array of other 
decisions that are made by other stakeholders, especially policymakers and 
downstream players, have a demonstrated high level of importance. 
 
Scenario analysis does not reveal a clear trade-off among the three analysed policy 
paradigms (smallholder resilience, smallholder adaptability and transformation of the 
system to maximize B100 output). As a matter of fact, they seem to rely on each other 
in most cases, which means PNPB objectives would most likely either fail completely 
or absolutely thrive. Given that the objectives of PNPB are not mutually exclusive, and, 
under the current rules, refineries rely on smallholders to be able to operate, the 
transformation of the production chain to maximize biodiesel output relies on 
smallholder resilience. As demonstrated in the analysis of the pull scenario, a trade-off 
might occur between resilience and adaptability, since maintaining farmers’ lifestyle 
options contradicts with making sure they stay in the rural areas. This trade-off arises 





The relatively low importance of BD in this context, even when a 15% blend is taken 
into consideration, is not in line with previous literature such as Rathmann, Szklo, and 
Schaeffer (2012), who understood that from a 7% blend on, BD would start driving the 
soybean markets in general, gaining importance over other soy products and pushing 
prices. 
 
Contrary to the initial hypothesis, simulation demonstrates that refineries (and even 
other players) do not control land prices, crop prices or the behaviour of the system in 
general. BD is still a minor phenomenon if we consider the entire context of commodity 
production chains, including high-volume commoditized products such as the soy grain 
itself or soy meal. Premium grain prices, when refineries intentionally manipulate grain 
prices to determine supply levels in the absence of soy smallholders (as depicted on 
Figure 28), are only observed in very specific situations. 
 
 
Figure 28. Causal loop diagram with premium price, elaborated by the author 
 
For this additional ‘Premium price’ balancing loop (Figure 27) to dominate, pull 
pressures must be very intense (i.e. stronger than our pull scenario – compare Figures 
20 and 29), and, at the same time, the premium has to be much higher than the one 
that has been paid in the past (reported both by the interviewees and by Da Silva et al, 
2018). The model can be utilized to artificially create a forced ‘last survivors win’ 
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scenario where the number of smallholders (Figure 30) would decline more intensely 
than in the pull scenario, and the ones staying as smallholder soy farmers would benefit 
from an important increase in their assets (Figure 31). 
 
Figure 30. Number of soy smallholders over time in a forced scenario where the last 
survivors would benefit from this situation, generated by the model 
 
 
Figure 31. Evolution of assets over time in a forced scenario where the last 
smallholder survivors would benefit from this situation, generated by the model 
 
In such cases, a desperate attempt by refineries to save their smallholder supply might 
lead to a situation where the more resistant smallholders who are able to stay in their 
lands until this extreme scenario occurs get a financial reward for their resistance 
(Figure 31). This resistance can be interpreted as a consequence of efficiency – 
meaning the most efficient farmers would survive this scenario. This situation might 
also be seen as a ‘professionalize or give up’ type of dilemma, typical of the rise of 
industrial agriculture. Those who decide to persist in the farming activity, must become 




However, the author considers the entire situation where the last survivors would win 
not probable, not only for the unusual combination of conditions that would be required 
but also because refineries would have other options, beyond the boundaries of this 
model-based study, to avoid being in the hands of the most successful small farmers, 
such as lobbying to change the legal requirements, increasing the acquisition form 
cooperatives that reduce the requirements, or even reducing production and invest 
their previous profits in other activities. Recent lobbying efforts led to the government 
to relax some SCS requisites (Agrolink, 2019). At least one refinery is reported by 
international sources for having offshore bank accounts to remove capital from Brazil 
(ICIJ, 2019). Forgive the opinionated note, but this extractive dynamic by commodity 
players is recurrent in the history of this young nation where the author was born. 
 
Policies (Table 11) that create buffers to crop price and farming cost variations also 
seem to make sense to pursue the three proposed policy paradigms at the same time. 
One interviewed farmer claimed for longer term funding mechanisms (nowadays 
available in a yearly basis). When questioned about the possibility of acting as a long-
term financier of smallholders, the interviewed refinery representative argued that this 
could generate irresponsible financial conduct. 
 
Table 11 
Suggested policies by stakeholder, based on sensitive variables, elaborated by the 
author 
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Vocational training for 
both young and 
mature populations 
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Perhaps one of the main counterintuitive behaviours observed by this research occurs 
in the pull scenario (Figures 20 and 21). It would be expected that, if soy farmers are 
getting richer (increasing their assets), they would remain as soy farmers. However, in 
this scenario, there is a relatively slow trend of rural exodus after the smallholder farmer 
population reaches a peak. At the same time, farmers assets remain above the bond-
adjusted asset curve. This could mean an opportunity for them to leave the rural areas 
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with some savings to restart their lives in the city (as supported by interviews as an 
answer for research question 3). This counterintuitive behaviour calls for the 
importance of training and capacity-building public policies for farmers that almost 
inevitably leave their rural lives. Their transition to city life is probably not easy without 
this support, even if they have savings. 
 
Research Question 3: What happens to smallholder farmers involved in SCS 
when severe resilience loss (or regime shift, in the resilience jargon) occurs? 
 
Transition to urban life in cities nearby and, in some cases, regret and return to rural 
areas has been pointed by the interviewees as the outcome of rural exodus. The 
journey of these 21st century migrants after moving to cities, and the feedback 




The timing of rural exodus seems to be a key aspect neglected by literature. The 
moment when farmers sell their land seems to be an important factor to determine how 
well off they will be when they do so. Building (crop and land) market intelligence for 
farmers is an envisioned next step for this research. Games and simulators could serve 
that purpose. 
 
Adapting this research to other contexts (territories, sectors, crops) could lead to the 
construction of a set of tools to help farmers in general know their risks and potential 
ways out. Agriculture systems can vary a lot, though. It is expected that the structure 
of production chains and industrial agriculture policies (including BE policies), as well 
as the order of importance of the risks faced by farmers, is different depending on the 
case. 
 
Model-based variance analysis might be an important pathway to understand 
simulation outcomes by specifying what decisions and scenarios would lead to 
disruptive regime shifts. It can allow the construction of simple simulation tools that 
indicate if a given decision generates collapse or not, which might be important to 
support political narratives in polarized political settings typical of our era. 
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Nevertheless, these tools should not refrain from allowing users to learn about model 
structure. As recommended by Stirling (2010), policy advice, in the context of 
complexity, must include risk-related knowledge transfer not to be used as scapegoat 
by decision makers 
 
This work, including the policies suggested in Table 11, that, by the way, require 
continued testing and validation, has the potential to inform BE policies internationally. 
It might generate opportunities to inform mainstream climate models and studies that 
influence global climate policy. Comparative studies across different regions, as well 
as integration with mainstream climate models are in the author’s horizon for future 
research endeavours.  
 
This modest research project brought together three research traditions that seldom 
interact: system dynamics (often operationalized by stock-and-flow modelling), 
resilience studies (often based on the complex adaptive system paradigm, 
operationalized by agent-based, statistics and network models) and climate research 
(often operationalized by large input-output models programmed in languages such as 
Phyton, based on deductive decision assumptions). This is a demonstration of the 
potential for the integration of different knowledge systems and academic fields to 
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Annex 1 – Model documentation 
Modelling software: Stella Architect 
Start Time: 2008 
Stop Time: 2050 
Timestep: 1/32 (necessary due to short processing delays at processor stage) 
Method: Euler 
 
This model relies on two data imports to run: ‘Copy of data export.xlsx’ (price data) 
and ‘cost data export.xlsx’ (cost data). On Stella, for both files, please use a dynamic 
link type to load time varying values with an extrapolation behaviour. 
 






(800+933.33+1300+600+650+1150+300+300+500+200)*365 Rio Grande do Sul state capacity of 
B100 production (refinery capacity) 





0.50 From SEAD  (2018b) data we know 
that 0.78 of the soy in RS state 
comes from cooperatives. We 
assume a higher fraction of 
cooperatives above 0.8 smallholder 
prevalence because this is more 












1.2 This is defined by SEAD (2018). 
There is a bigger discount on the 
mandatory smallholder blend if the 
cooperative has >0.8 smallholder 













0 This is a parameter of an observer 
structure in the model, not  affecting 
behavior. It is about the initial 
market-share of an observed actor in 




0.2 This is a parameter that defines the 
percentage of the current cash to be 
invested by farming and downstream 
players in land acquisition. There is 
no reference value available, but 0.2 
is considered to be a maximum, as it 
is hard to imagine a player that 
usually operates in another segment 
spending all its investment capacity 
in land acquisition. For a farmer, 
higher values could apply, though. 
"%_debt_su
pplier" 
0.58 In case there is farmer debt, part of it 
is upstream (suppliers). 58% is 
adopted as it is the proportion of 
farming costs that are derived from 
supplies, as shown by the RS state 
Agriculture Department (Secretaria 
da Agricultura, 2018). 
"%_direct_s
ales" 
0.05 A minority of the soy harvest arrive to 
processors without going through a 
third-party storage and brokerage, 




0.00001/3 This is a parameter of an observer 
structure in the model, not  affecting 
behavior. It is about the initial 
market-share of an observed actor in 
the farming market. This value will 
generate a 60 hectares initial land 
size (including rented land), which is 




0.25 This describes how much of the 
harvest is made with harvesters 
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owned by the farmers. The value is a 




0 This is a parameter of an observer 
structure in the model, not  affecting 
behavior. It is about the initial 
market-share of an observed actor in 




0.6 The available data (IBGE-Sidra) 
about the % of land that is owned by 
the farmers who grow crops on them 
was judged not trustworthy due to its 
complete disconnection with the 
observed reality. A range between 




0.18 Only part of the soybean is oil. The 
number is a rule of thumb in the 
sector, comes from Cavalcante, 




0 This is a parameter of an observer 
structure in the model, not  affecting 
behavior. It is about the initial 
market-share of an observed actor in 











IF Farmer_soy_land>0 THEN IF 
(ref_smallholder_land_among_farmers+(Soy_land_acquired_by_sma
llholders/Farmer_soy_land))*(Farmer_soy_land/Total_soy_land) > 1 




This equation considers the soy land 
acquired by smallholders and 
adjusts it to result in a proportion of 








B100_production/Oil_extraction Whenever soy is crushed, oil is 
extracted. However, biodiesel (in its 
purest form, B100) is not always a 




0 This is a parameter of an observer 
structure in the model, not  affecting 
behavior. It is about the initial 
market-share of an observed actor in 




0 This is a parameter of an observer 
structure in the model, not  affecting 
behavior. It is about the initial 
market-share of an observed actor in 
the supplies (pesticides, fertilizers 




IF Land_price>Min_farmer_land_sales_price THEN ((Land_price-
Min_farmer_land_sales_price)/Min_farmer_land_sales_price) ELSE 0 
In the context of land markets. 
Farmers only provide land as supply 
if the price is above their minimum 
accepted price. 
Assets Cash_owned+Land_value_owned+Other_assets_owned In the context of assessing total 






n_dedicated_to_biodiesel" THEN 1 ELSE 0 
This switch regulates whether the 
processors will pay a premium price. 
If the required % of smallholder 
content in their supplies is higher 
than the percentage of smallholders 
among soy farmers, it starts to get 
more difficult to find smallholders, 
which justifies the payment of  a 
premium price. If not all the soy 
production is crushed by processors 
able to produce B100, the supply 









Whenever processors pay a 
premium price, they only have to pay 
it to a fraction of the smallholders. 
Moreover, this is alleviated by some 











Whenever smallholders buy land, 
the average smallholder area has to 
grow, but it cannot surpass the 




40 hectares There is no data available about it, 
but as the maximum area to be 
considered smallholder in the region 
is 80 hectares, we assume a value of 




0.87 Oil is less dense than water. 
B100_price Exogenous. The values come from an ANP 
(2018) time series that is repeated 
until the end time of the model. 
B100_produ
ction 
IF Oil_extraction<B100_production_capacity THEN Oil_extraction 
ELSE B100_production_capacity 
B100 production can be limited 




Exogenous This is the biodiesel (B100) mixture 
on diesel. The time series comes 
from the laws and regulations that 
establish the mandatory blend in 
Brazil. As there is no prevision in law 
for blends higher than 0.15, this is 
the adopted plateau. 
biodiesel_s
witch 
1 A switch to define whether there is 






Bond_adjusted_assets(t - dt) + (Rate) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  




This is a stock that is embedded in 
an observer structure to analyze the 
evolution of assets of a given agent 
over time as compared to a risk-free 









w) * dt 
Broker_cash(t) = Broker_cash(t - dt) + (cashflow + 
Broker_farming_cashflow) * dt 
    INIT Broker_cash = Initial_cash 
    INFLOWS: 
     cashflow = (1-"%_direct_sales") 
*(Sales_to_processors*Brokerage_margin*Grain_price) 
  
A stock that accumulates the cash 
derived from brokerage activities 
and farming activities in farms owned 
by original brokers. Whenever there 
is a direct sale from farmer to 
processor, there is no brokerage, so 






The cashflow of farming activities 
performed by original brokers. Land 
acquisition counts negatively. 
Brokerage 
margin 
0.1 Brokerage activities have zero 
margin in efficient markets. In 
commodity markets this margin 




0 Just outlining a limitation of the 
model: capacity expansions costs, 
that would be important for storage 
players and processors, are not 
taken into account. 
Cash_owne
d 










In the observer structure, this 
measures the cash of agents with 
respect to their presence in different 
markets. A distinction was needed to 
calculate the effects of premium 














2 years Typical debt execution time for 
suppliers that take land as 
guarantee. It does not happen in the 
first year because the first year is the 
expected payment time, then on the 
second year they can execute the 
debt in the form of land. 
Farmer_cas
h(t) 
Farmer_cash(t - dt) + (Farming_cashflow - Livelihood_expense) * dt 
  
    INIT Farmer_cash = Initial_cash 
  
    INFLOWS: 









     Livelihood_expense = 
Number_of_soy_smallholder_farmers*Farmer_family_expenditure 
  
Farners’ cash depend on the farming 












Land_price*Land_acquisition_from_farmers Whenever farmers sell land, their 
cash reserve increases. 
Farmer_soy
_land(t) 
Farmer_soy_land(t - dt) + (Crop_conversion - 
Land_acquisition_by_harvesters - Debt_execution - 
Land_acquisition_by_storage_players - Land_acquisition_by_brokers 
- Land_acquisition_by_processors) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
  
INIT Farmer_soy_land = Initial_soy_land 
  
    INFLOWS: 
     Crop_conversion = IF Perceived_soy_margin>"Non-
soy_margin" AND "Non-soy_productive_land"/("Non-
soy_productive_land"+Farmer_soy_land+Land_owned_by_downstre
am_players+Supplier_land) > Minimum_crop_rotation THEN 
(((Perceived_soy_margin-"Non-soy_margin")/"Non-
soy_margin")*"Non-soy_productive_land")/Conversion_time ELSE IF 
Perceived_soy_margin> 
Min_perceived_margin_not_to_convert_back THEN 0 ELSE IF 
((("Non-soy_margin"+Perceived_soy_margin)/"Non-
soy_margin")*Farmer_soy_land)/Conversion_time < 0 THEN ((("Non-
soy_margin"+Perceived_soy_margin)/"Non-
soy_margin")*Farmer_soy_land)/Conversion_time ELSE 0 
    
OUTFLOWS: 
     Land_acquisition_by_harvesters = IF Land_price> 




_price/Time_to_acquire_land ELSE 0 {UNIFLOW} 
     Debt_execution = IF Farmer_cash<0 THEN (-
Farmer_cash/Land_price/debt_execution_time)*("%_debt_supplier"*
SWTICH_debt_guaranteed_by_land) ELSE 0 {UNIFLOW} 





acquire_land ELSE 0 {UNIFLOW} 
     Land_acquisition_by_brokers = IF 
Land_price>Min_farmer_land_sales_price AND 
Perceived_soy_margin>0 THEN ((Land_price-
Stock of soy lands in the hands of 
original farmers. Whenever there is 
land acquisition by downstream 
players or debt execution by 
suppliers, this stock is deducted. 
  
Crop conversion to soy can only 
happen if the perceived soy margin 
is better than the other crops’ and, at 
the same time, there is land available 
even considering crop rotation 







The logic of land acquisition is similar 
among all downstream players. They 
buy land if they have investment 
capacity derived from their past 
activities and if the farmers are 
willing to sell for current prices. 
Debt execution by suppliers is 
different, as indebted farmers do not 






nd ELSE 0 {UNIFLOW} 





acquire_land ELSE 0 {UNIFLOW} 
Fertilizer_ex
penditure 
Exogenous This comes from a time series by the 
Department of Agriculture. The time 
series is simply repeated until the 





20 hectares In Brazilian policies, a farmer is 
considered a smallholder if the land 
he grows is less than 4 fiscal 
modules, which vary according to the 
region. In most of the RS state, as in 
the specific researched area, this 




0.5 [unitless] Whenever farmers buy land, a 
fraction of the land acquisitions is 
performed by newcomers or farmers 








g_farmers" ELSE 1 
  
Premium price is only paid to part of 




Required_%_of_smallholder_acquisition*(1-Prevalence_of_fraud) Identity frauds area relatively 
common and make the actual 
required % of smallholders to be 




0.065 per year This asset (government bonds) is as 
close as one can get to a risk-free 
investment in Brazil. It currently pays 
6.5% per annum. 
Grain price Exogenous A time series from Conab (2018) 




1000 hectares The area that a single harvester can 
cover, approximately. This is the 
reality of more modern harvester, but 
the actual number is unknown. 
Harvester_d
epreciation 
0.033 per year This assumes a 30 year longevity of 
a harvester. The actual number is 
unknown and changing as new 
technologies are introduced. 
Harvester_p
rice 
1300000 BRL This is the price tag that was cited by 
the interviewed farmers, although 
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more modern harvesters can be 
even more expensive. 
Harvester_r
ent 
151.09 BRL/hectares/year From Department of Agriculture 





Harvesting_player_accumulated_profits(t - dt) + (Harvesting_profits + 
Harvester_farming_cashflow) * dt 
  
 INIT Harvesting_player_accumulated_profits = Initial_cash 
  









A stock that accumulates the cash 
derived from harvesting 
service/harvester rent activities and 
farming activities in farms owned by 
original harvesters. Whenever 
harvesters are owned by farmers, 
there is no harvester cash 
generation. 




1 per year Self-explanatory 
Inflation rate 0.04 Inflation rate in Brazil. The model is 
in 2008 values (no inflation 
accounted). The only use for this rate 
is when accounting the risk-free 
government bonds, because 
inflation is embedded in that interest 











In the context of an observer 
structure, these are the initial assets 
of the observed market player. 
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Initial cash 2*30000000000/6 The same value was adopted for all 
the aggregated roles in the supply 
chain, so that the model would not 
start with a disparity in terms of 
bargain power. The value is 
approximately twice the state 
agricultural GDP of one year. 
Initial_land_
price 





4000000 hectares Approximated level of non-
commodity land in the state in 2008 




3000000 hectares Approximated level of other 
commodity land in the state in 2008 
based on 2006 data by IBGE (2019). 
This value excludes natural fields 
used for bovines, although bovines 
can be considered a commodity. As 




3000000 hectares Approximated level of soy land in the 
state in 2008 based on 2006 data by 
IBGE (2019) 
Interest IF Farmer_cash < 0 THEN Farmer_cash*Interest_rate ELSE 0 
  
This is the interest paid by farmers 
who finish an year with negative 
cash, which means their debt goes 
beyond harvest-related that. 
Interest_rate 0.055 per year This interest rate was mentioned on 
the interviews, which is the usual 





her_commodities+Initial_soy_land) > 0 AND 
"%_farming_market_share"*(Initial_non_commodity_land+Initial_othe
r_commodities+Initial_soy_land)<Max_smallholder_area THEN 1 
ELSE 0 
Within the context of the observer 
structure, a variable to determine if 

















roker_cash+Processor_cash)*"%_cash_invested_in_land") ELSE 0 
There is land demand by 
downstream players if there is a 
perceived soy margin and they are 




IF Farmer_cash>0 THEN (Farmer_cash*"%_cash_invested_in_land") 
ELSE 0 





Land_owned_by_brokers(t - dt) + (Land_acquisition_by_brokers) * dt 
{NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Land_owned_by_brokers = 0 
    INFLOWS: 





nd ELSE 0 {UNIFLOW} 
A stock of land owned by original 
brokers who acquire land. They only 
buy soy land if there is a positive 
perceived margin and if the farmers 













Land_owned_by_harvesting_players(t - dt) + 
(Land_acquisition_by_harvesters) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Land_owned_by_harvesting_players = 0 
    INFLOWS: 
     Land_acquisition_by_harvesters = IF Land_price> 




_price/Time_to_acquire_land ELSE 0 {UNIFLOW} 
  
A stock of land owned by original 
harvesting service 
providers/harvester renters who 
acquire land. They only buy soy land 
if there is a positive perceived margin 






Land_owned_by_processors(t - dt) + 
(Land_acquisition_by_processors) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Land_owned_by_processors = 0 
    INFLOWS: 





acquire_land ELSE 0 {UNIFLOW} 
A stock of land owned by original 
processors (refineries or not) who 
acquire land. They only buy soy land 
if there is a positive perceived margin 




A typical price equation smoothed 




0.025 According to the interviewees, this 
ratio between rent and price can vary 





Supply of land for soy is the non-soy 
commodity land that is not reserved 
for crop rotation plus the land that is 
on sale by farmers. 
Land_supply
_by_farmers 










In the context of an observer 
structure, this is the land value 
owned by an observed player. 
Logistical 
costs 
Exogenous Data coming from Department of 
Agriculture (Secretaria de 
Agricultura, 2018) time series. 






IF "%_soy_land_non-smallholder">0.7 AND Market_control_switch>0 
THEN 1+(0.2*"%_soy_land_non-smallholder") ELSE 1 
When there are too few smallholders 
in a territory, suppliers and other 
players might feel it is better to 
corner them by raising prices. 
This  hypothetical mechanism, that is 




0 This is a switch for the hypothetical 
mechanism described above. 
Max_smallh
older_area 
4*Fiscal_module_area As defined by Brazilian law, farmers 
are only considered smallholders if 
they have 4 fiscal modules or less. 
Meal price Exogenous From an IMEA (2019) time series, 
these are the soy meal prices 
observed over time. The time series 





12000 BRL/hectare Based on the interviews, the farmers 
would not sell below this 2008-
adjusted value, which is about 






20 BRL/tonnes/year Based on the interviews, they would 
not convert back above this value. 
On the interview, they talked about 
BRL 60/sack which is very close to 
zero margin, but probably some 
supplies would also deflate in that 
case, so we considered adding 20. 
Minimum_cr
op_rotation 
0.3 We know the value is below 0.5 
because not every farmer does a 50-
50 rotation (some do not perform it at 
all), but the exact value is unknown. 







Money_spent_from_premium(t) = Money_spent_from_premium(t - 
dt) + (Premium_expenditure) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
 INIT Money_spent_from_premium = 0 
 UNITS: BRL 
 INFLOWS: 
     Premium_expenditure = IF 
Money_spent_from_premium<Premium_Paid THEN 
Land_acquisition_by_smallholders*Land_price ELSE 0 {UNIFLOW} 
         UNITS: BRL/Year 
  
To be able to calculate the real % 
smallholders, there is a need to 
understand the land acquisitions 
they might perform due to the fact 
they have access to premium prices 





200 BRL/hectare/year Non-commodity crops are usually 
high-value crops, but with a difficult 
crop management when compared 
to commodities, which explains why 
they rarely figure in the minds of 
farmers as alternatives to soy. 
Therefore, conversion from and to 





"Non-commodity_land"(t - dt) {NON-NEGATIVE} 






100 BRL/hectare/year Non-soy commodity margin, in the 
minds of the interviewed farmers, is 
usually corn margin. Corn is a low-
margin crop with low risk and simple 
crop management requirements. It 
serves as food for milk cows, which 
is an activity that does not require a 
lot of land. Summing the margin of 
these two activities per hectare, the 







"Non-soy_productive_land"(t - dt) + (Change_in_productive_land - 
Crop_conversion) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT "Non-soy_productive_land" = Initial_other_commodities 
    INFLOWS: 
     Change_in_productive_land = 100000 
    OUTFLOWS: 
     Crop_conversion = IF Perceived_soy_margin>"Non-
soy_margin" AND "Non-soy_productive_land"/("Non-
soy_productive_land"+Farmer_soy_land+Land_owned_by_downstre
am_players+Supplier_land) > Minimum_crop_rotation THEN 
(((Perceived_soy_margin-"Non-soy_margin")/"Non-
soy_margin")*"Non-soy_productive_land")/Conversion_time ELSE IF 
Perceived_soy_margin> 
Min_perceived_margin_not_to_convert_back THEN 0 ELSE IF 
((("Non-soy_margin"+Perceived_soy_margin)/"Non-
soy_margin")*Farmer_soy_land)/Conversion_time < 0 THEN ((("Non-
soy_margin"+Perceived_soy_margin)/"Non-
soy_margin")*Farmer_soy_land)/Conversion_time ELSE 0 
  
Non-soy commodity land changes if 
there is conversion from non-
productive land or conversion 
to/from soy, which can happen if 
there is a positive perception of soy 
margin as compared to other 
commodities. Crop rotation prevents 
all the land to be converted to soy. 
The value adopted for 
Change_in_productive_land is about 
30% below the average of the last 











1 [farmer] In the context of the observer 
structure, this variable serves the 
purpose of indicating to how many 







In the context of an observer 
structure, this is an approximation to 
calculate the value of pre-existing 
assets such as harvesters, supply, 
storage, brokerage and processing 
businesses. Harvester price is used 
for a proxy for all the businesses. 
Other_costs Exogenous An aggregation of other soy farming 
cost beyond the key ones, according 
to Department of Agriculture 
(Secretaria de Agricultura, 2018). 
The values are repeated after the 





SMTH3(Soy_farming_margin, 2) Farmers take time to perceive 
changes in soy margin, especially 
due to the existence of opportunity 
costs from land, harvester 
ownership, among others. However, 
crop decisions are annual, and this 
pushes the value lower. 
Pesticide_ex
penditure 
Exogenous Time series from Department of 
Agriculture (2018) repeated until the 
end of the simulation. 
Premium (1.00/60*1000) BRL/tonne When asked about premium price 
paid to smallholders, Processor B 
mentioned they used to pay a little 
more than BRL 1 per sack in the 
past. Each sack has 60kg, and the 
unit of the model is metric tonne. 
Premium_P
aid 
Premium_Paid(t) = Premium_Paid(t - dt) + (Premium_Payment) * dt 
{NON-NEGATIVE} 
 INIT Premium_Paid = 0 
 UNITS: BRL 
 INFLOWS: 
     Premium_Payment = Avg_premium_paid*Soy_production 
{UNIFLOW} 
         UNITS: BRL/Year 
In the context of an observer 
structure, this represents the 
payment of price premiums from 




Automatic_premium_SWITCH Premium price paid by refineries on 
this model can be activated manually 





Money_spent_from_premium)/Farmer_cash ELSE IF 
Farmer_cash+(Premium_Paid-Money_spent_from_premium)>0 
THEN 1 ELSE 0 
  
This is to calculate the importance of 
premium money in comparison to the 
cashflow of farmers who do not have 





0.5/2.7 Interviews revealed two types of 
identity fraud: one consists in 
disaggregating families to generate 
several independent smallholder 
entries in the government systems. 
The other consists in making farmers 
invoice refineries even if a part of 
that productions is actually going to 
other buyers. The extent of these 
practices is hard to determine, but 
they cannot be prevailing enough to 
distort official productivity data of 
biodiesel soy above the usual 
distortion which is around 0.5/2.7. 
Processing_
costs 
50 BRL/tonnes Very hard to derive from refineries 
financial data because they 
aggregate sourcing, logistics and 
processing costs on the same line. 
As we know the other two 




Processor_cash(t - dt) + (Processor_cashflow + 
Processor_farming_cashflow) * dt 
    INIT Processor_cash = Initial_cash 















A stock that accumulates the cash 
derived from processing activities 
and farming activities in farms owned 
by original processors. 
  
Downstream logistical costs are 
sometimes subsidized by 
processors, and therefore have to be 
deducted as well as premium prices. 
  




0.1 year Crushing and the other physical 
processes that happen within 
processors (incl refineries) are 
simple and fast. 
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Productivity IF Productivity_shocks_switch > 0 THEN 
Ref_productivity*Productivity_shocks ELSE Ref_productivity 
  




GRAPH(TIME) A discretionary variable to be used 










 UNITS: unitless 
 DOCUMENT: 
https://sidra.ibge.gov.br/tabela/1421#resultado - 32.76% in 2006 
  
2006 data from SIDRA/IBGE (2019). 
Ref_producti
vity 
2.7 tonnes/hectare This is the reference productivity 
used by Department of Agriculture 
(Secretaria de Agricultura, 2018) to 
calculate costs. The actual 
productivity has increased over time 
since 2008, but this variation is 
ignored by the model, because it 














Ordinance 515 (SEAD, 2018) 
defines the minimum % of 
smallholder acquisition by refineries 














Exogenous From the cost time series by 
Department of Agriculture 
(Secretaria de Agricultura, 2018) 
Sensitivity 0.44 Elasticity, specific to Brazil, from Barr 






0 This is a processor policy to 








Soy_acquired_by_processors(t - dt) + (Sales_to_processors - 
Oil_extraction - Meal_production) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Soy_acquired_by_processors = 375 
    INFLOWS: 
     Sales_to_processors = Soy_stored/Time_to_sell 
{UNIFLOW} 
    OUTFLOWS: 
     Oil_extraction = 
Soy_acquired_by_processors*("%_oil_mass_in_grain")/Production_ti
me {UNIFLOW} 
     Meal_production = Soy_acquired_by_processors*(1-
"%_oil_mass_in_grain")/Production_time {UNIFLOW} 
  
Stock of soy waiting to be processed. 














Soy farming margin according to the 
implemented cost structure. The 
payment of a market control 
premium only happens when this 
policy is activated and only applies to 
supplies and storage. Logistical 








Soy_land_acquired_by_smallholders(t - dt) + 
(Land_acquisition_by_smallholders) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
 INIT Soy_land_acquired_by_smallholders = 600000 
 UNITS: hectares 
 INFLOWS: 
     Land_acquisition_by_smallholders = IF 
Farmer_soy_land>Soy_land_acquired_by_smallholders THEN 
(Farmer_soy_land*"Premium/cash")/Time_to_acquire_land ELSE 0 
{UNIFLOW} 
         UNITS: Hectares/Years 
  
Stock of land acquired by 
smallholders using their premium 




Soy_stored(t - dt) + (Soy_production - Sales_to_processors) * dt 
{NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Soy_stored = 4000000 
    INFLOWS: 
     Soy_production = 
(Farmer_soy_land+Supplier_land+Land_owned_by_downstream_pla
yers)*(Productivity) {UNIFLOW} 
    OUTFLOWS: 
     Sales_to_processors = Soy_stored/Time_to_sell 
{UNIFLOW} 
Soy stored in silos that are 
sometimes pre-sold or post-sold. In 
any case the storage player margin 
is paid by someone (farmer or 




5 BRL/tonne/year Very little information available about 
this. The marginal cost is treated as 
near zero, but, as we do not have 
amortization nor depreciation of 
storage infrastructure on the model, 






Storage_players_cash(t - dt) + (Storage_cashflow + 
Storage_player_farming_cashflow) * dt 
INIT Storage_players_cash = Initial_cash 
    INFLOWS: 
     Storage_cashflow = (1-
"%_direct_sales")*((Soy_stored*Storage_price*Market_control_premi
um)-(Soy_stored*Storage_cost)) 




A stock that accumulates the cash 
derived from storage activities and 
farming activities in farms owned by 
original storage players. Whenever 
there is a direct sale from farmer to 
processor, there is no storage, so 
this does not generate cash. 
Storage_pric
e 
77.16*2.7 BRL/tonnes/year From Department of Agriculture 
(Secretaria de Agricultura, 2018), 
adapted to be treated per tonne 
instead of per hectare. 
Supplier_ca
sh(t) 
Supplier_cash(t - dt) + (Supplier_cashflow) * dt 
    INIT Supplier_cash = 30000000000/6 
    INFLOWS: 





A stock that accumulates the cash 
derived from supplier activities and 
farming activities in farms owned by 
original suppliers. Pesticide, fertilizer 
and seed expenditures (from a 




Supplier_land(t - dt) + (Debt_execution) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Supplier_land = 0 
     Debt_execution = IF Farmer_cash<0 THEN (-
Farmer_cash/Land_price/debt_execution_time)*("%_debt_supplier"*
SWTICH_debt_guaranteed_by_land) ELSE 0 {UNIFLOW} 
Supplier land is acquired by debt 
execution whenever farmers owe 
money to suppliers that sign 
contracts using land as guarantee. 
Supplier_ma
rgin 





1 A switch to define the supplier policy 





10 years Land transactions take time from the 
moment they become attractive. 
Time_to_sell 0.5 year Soy grain sales to processors 
happen throughout the inter-harvest 
period that takes one year. The 











Annex 2 – Interview guides 
Objectives of the interview: 
- to detect threats to farmers’ resilience 
- to elicit decision rules related to the adherence to BE crops and BE 
programmes,  buying/selling land and to abandoning the farming activity 
- to make sure the interviewee is available for more interviews & surveys if 
needed 
- to obtain more contacts for further interviews & surveys 
 
The ‘why’ questions will be inverted to ‘why not’ when interviewing farmers who do not 
participate in BE schemes. 
  
Interview guide: 
First of all, thanks for having me today. As we talked before, my name is Igor and I’m 
interviewing you for a research project that aims to understand the reality of small 
biodiesel crops farmers. As a farmer [and cooperative leader], your point of view is key 
to understand the options farmers have in terms of growing these crops, joining the 
social programmes et cetera.  
 
May I record this conversation? I can send you the results later if you’d like. Everything 
will be treated anonymously. I will make sure that no one is able to trace your answers 
back to you. 
First I need to ask some questions to get to know you a bit better… how many are you 
in your family? Do your children live with you? 
Where is your farm located? How big is it? 
Is it yours or do you lease part of it? 
What crops do you have on it now? How much of each? 
Why don’t you grow more [crop 1]? 
Why don’t you grow more [crop n]? 
How do you decide if you’ll grow more food crops or biofuel crops? 
Why do you diversify crops? 
How do you learn about crop management (manejo)? 
Do you maintain inventories? How do you decide how much stock to maintain? 
Who is your main client for soybeans? 
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Lately, have you increased or decreased the area with biodiesel crops? Why? 
How does the climate (incl. water) influence that decision? Have you perceived any 
changes on the climate in the last years? How is it affecting the biodiesel crops? 
Can you tell me the story of how you got into biodiesel? What made you enter this 
world? What was the role of the social biodiesel programme? 
How does it work to sell your harvest to the biodiesel producers that are certified by 
the social biodiesel programme? Can you describe the process a bit? 
Is it a good deal nowadays to sell your harvest to them? Why? 
Do you negotiate the price with them? How does that happen? 
 
The 3 questions below will be supported by a threshold elicitation drawing as 
suggested by Ford and Sterman (1998): 
 
How low should the price be for you to stop selling it to BE processors? 
How high should the price be for you to expand the BE crops? 
Would this BE crop still be useful for anything else? How low should the price be for 
you to stop growing this BE crop even for other clients? 
 
Is your family making a living from the biodiesel crops? What else do you guys have 
to do to make a living? Tell me more about how you decide on where to try to earn 
money from… 
How much of the food you eat is planted at your farm? Is it hard to put food on the 
table? Why? 
What could make you buy more land? 
What could make you sell your land? 
Is the land price in your region getting higher or lower lately? Why? 
 
The 2 questions below will be supported by a threshold elicitation drawing as 
suggested by Ford and Sterman (1998): 
 
How high would an acquisition offer have to be for you to sell it? 
How low would your neighbours’ land price have to be for you to buy it? 
 
In your region, is there land being acquired or abandoned? What do the farmers do 
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after leaving their land? Why do you think they leave it? 
Do you fear having to abandon your current livelihood? What makes you fear? What 
risks do you see that could make your life worse? What would you do if you had to 
leave? 
Is there anything else you’d like to tell me about the things we talked? 
 
Thank you so much for your time and answers. I’m really happy to be able to know 
more about your reality. You guys are heroes. 
Could you provide some contacts of other farmers? Telephone number, whatsapp, 
email… 
Once more, thank you. I’ll be in touch with the results. May I contact you again if I need 




Annex 3 – Interview coding form (each interviewee is a column) 
 
RQ1: What are the threats for the resilience of smallholder farmers involved in the 
social biodiesel programme, especially those generated by the existence of the 
programme itself? 
RQ2: Which heuristics, decision rules and thresholds guide smallholder farmers’ 
decisions that relate to their own resilience? 
RQ3: What happens to smallholder farmers involved in the social biodiesel 
programme when severe resilience loss (or regime shift, in the resilience jargon) 
occurs? 
 
Family size (n) 
Family description 
Farm size (ha) 
Equipment (tractors, computers, software…) 




Crop 1 Area (ha) 
Why not more crop 1? 
Crop 2 
Crop 2 Area (ha) 
Why not more crop 2? 
Crop 3 
Crop 3 Area (ha) 
Why not more crop 3? 
Other crops 
Why not more other crops? 
Why to diversify 
BE vs other crops decision rule 
Climate influence on crop decision 
How do you learn about crop management (manejo)? 
To whom is the BE crop sold (incl non-BE and non-SCS buyers) 
Priority between BE and non-BE clients 
How got into BE incl role of social programme 
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Sales process to BE producer 
How good is the deal of selling to BE producer? 
How price is negotiated 
Quantity and schedule - how it is negotiated and executed 
Bureaucracy/technical visits 
How high should the price be for you to expand the BE crops? 
How low should the price be for you to stop growing this BE crop even for non-BE 
clients? 
 
What else besides farming to make a living 
 
% of food eaten grown 
Hard to put food on the table? 
 
What would have to happen to buy/sell land 
Recent land prices variation 
 
Elicitation of land buy/sell thresholds 
 
Are there people moving out? 
Why? What do they do afterwards? 
Perceived risks? 
What would you do if you left? 
 
Anything else you wanna say? 
Contacts for later 

















































































































"%_oil_mass_in_grain" Not sensitive 




























































































Capacity_expansion_costs Not sensitive 





































































    
Yes 
Harvests per year 
Not 
sensitive 
     
Inflation rate Not sensitive 
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Time_to_acquire_land 
Not 
sensitive 
  
ok 
  
Time_to_sell 
Not 
sensitive 
  
Ok 
  
 
